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“GRAND ENTRANCE HALL,” 
BACK DOOR OR FOUNDATION 
STONE? THE ROLE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
IN CONSTRUING AND 





The ship of state is run and governed by a most difficult mechanism of rules, 
principles, precedents and administrative wheels. Without a thorough knowledge of 
this complicated machinery, there is not much use in trying to direct its course in a 
proper channel and a correct way. 
 
Maurice Ollivier, Problems of Canadian Sovereignty (1945) 
I. INTRODUCTION: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,  
CONVENTIONS AND PRINCIPLES 
In the wake of the Supreme Court of Canada‟s opinions in the Provincial 
Court Judges Reference1 and the Quebec Secession Reference,2 the courts have 
________________________________________________________________ 
* B.A., B.C.L., LL.B. (McGill), of the Bars of Quebec and Ontario; General Counsel, 
Constitutional and Administrative Law Section, Department of Justice of Canada. This paper was 
originally presented at the April 6, 2001 conference entitled “2000 Constitutional Cases: Fourth 
Annual Analysis of the Constitutional Decisions of the S.C.C.” sponsored by the Professional 
Development Program at Osgoode Hall Law School. The views expressed herein are meant to 
stimulate debate and should not be taken as necessarily reflecting the position of the Department. 
1
 Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island; 
Reference re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward 
Island; R. v. Campbell; R. v. Ekmecic; R. v. Wickman; Manitoba Provincial Court Judges Assn. v. 
Manitoba (Minister of Justice), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3. The current trend began after the decisions of the 
Court in New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly), 
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 319, holding inter alia that parliamentary privileges “fall within the group of 
198 Supreme Court Law Review (2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
 
Job Name: SCLR14      Time:00:19       1st proofs  Date:Saturday, February 11, 2012 
been seized with an ever-burgeoning multitude of new cases in which the 
constitutional principles of judicial independence,3 federalism, democracy, the 
rule of law and the protection of minorities4 have been invoked to challenge the 
                                                                                                                                
principles constitutionalized by virtue of [the] preamble” to the Constitution Act, 1867 (at 377, per 
McLachlin, J., as she then was, for the majority), and Hunt v. T&N plc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289, in 
which interprovincial recognition and enforcement of court judgments were premised on the “full 
faith and credit” doctrine “inherent in the structure of the Canadian federation, and, as such, […] 
beyond the power of provincial legislatures to override” (at 324, per La Forest J., for the Court). 
However, the proliferation of cases invoking constitutional principles became especially noticeable 
after the Provincial Court Judges and the Quebec Secession references (infra, note 2). 
2
 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. I disclose that I was of counsel 
for the Attorney General of Canada in this reference and in several of the cases subsequently 
referred to in these remarks, including the Potter and Hogan matters (infra, note 4) as well as the 
Lalonde case (infra, note 4).  
3
 See Alberta Provincial Judges’ Assn. v. Alberta (1999), 177 D.L.R. (4th) 418 (Alta. 
C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. denied June 8, 2000; Re British Columbia Legislative Assembly, 
Resolution on Judicial Compensation (1998), 160 D.L.R. (4th) 477 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to 
S.C.C. denied January 21, 1999; Conférence des juges du Québec c. Québec (Procureur général), 
[2000] J.Q. No 400 (C.S.Q.); Newfoundland Association of Provincial Court Judges v. 
Newfoundland (2000), 191 D.L.R. (4th) 225 (Nfld. C.A.); Ell v. Alberta (2000), 83 Alta. L.R. (3d) 
215 (C.A.); Re Independence of the Provincial Court of British Columbia Justices of the Peace 
(2000), 81 B.C.L.R. (3d) 164 (S.C.) (per Siguardson J.); Re Therrien, 2001 SCC 35. 
4
 See Samson v. Canada (Attorney General) (1998), 165 D.L.R. (4th) 342 (F.C.T.D.), 
notice of appeal to F.C.A. filed, but appeal subsequently abandoned (principle of democracy); 
Brown v. Alberta (1999), 177 D.L.R. (4th) 349 (Alta. C.A.) (principle of democracy); Potter v. 
Quebec (Attorney General), [1999] R.J.Q. 165 (S.C.Q.) (principle of protection of minorities raised 
in appeal pending before Quebec Court of Appeal; Bacon v. Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corp. 
(1999), 180 Sask. R. 20, 205 W.A.C. 20, [1999] 11 W.W.R. 51 (Sask. C.A), leave to appeal to 
S.C.C. denied on June 1, 2000 (rule of law principle); Singh v. Canada (Attorney General) (sub nom. 
Westergard-Thorpe v. Canada (Attorney General), [2000] 3 F.C. 185 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. 
denied on August 10, 2000 (principles of parliamentary supremacy, rule of law and judicial 
independence); Lalonde v. Ontario (Commission de restructuration des services de santé) (2000), 48 
O.R. (3d) 50 (Div. Ct.), appeal heard May 14 to 17, 2001, and decision of Ontario Court of Appeal 
pending (principle of protection of minorities); Hogan v. Newfoundland (Attorney General) (2000), 
183 D.L.R. (4th) 225 (Nfld. C.A.), application for leave to appeal before S.C.C. denied on November 
9, 2000 (principles of federalism, democracy, rule of law and protection of minorities); Dehenne v. 
Dehenne (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 140 (S.C.J.) (principle of protection of minorities); JTI-Macdonald 
Corp. v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (2000), 184 D.L.R. (4th) 335 (B.C.S.C.) (federalism 
and rule of law); Wilder v. Ontario (Securities Commission) (2000), 184 D.L.R. (4th) 165 (Ont. 
Div. Ct.), affd (2001), 197 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (Ont. C.A.) (rule of law, independence of bar and 
judiciary); Public School Boards’ Assn. of Alberta v. Alberta (Attorney General), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 
409 (refusing to recognize a purported constitutional principle or convention of reasonable 
autonomy for municipal institutions, or a principle of mirror equality between rights of public 
schools and those of separate schools). Several motions for declaratory judgment challenging the 
validity of Bill 170, Quebec‟s municipal amalgamation legislation (S.Q. 2000, c. 56), and related 
amendments on the basis, inter alia, of the principles of democracy and the protection of minorities, 
have recently been denied by the Quebec Superior Court: Villes de Baie d’Urfé, Westmount, 
(2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d)     The Role of Constitutional Principles 199 
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validity of constitutional amendments,5 statutory provisions6 and governmental 
action.7 Legal practitioners, long used to equating “the Constitution of Canada” 
with the written text of the Constitution Acts,8 were now left wondering as to 
the extent to which, if at all, constitutional principles might supplant (or at least 
supplement) constitutional provisions as a source of supreme and fundamental 
law, and might thus provide the basis for legal rules or constitutional 
obligations enforceable by the courts. 
The Constitution of Canada, taken in its broader analytical sense, has always 
embraced not only the provisions of the written text but also the conventions of 
the Constitution — the unwritten rules regarding the operation of the 
constitutional framework that political actors consider to be binding upon 
themselves and their actions. However, constitutional conventions are more 
within the realm of political science9 than that of law because although they are 
normative rules in that they are understood to be obligatory, the sanction for 
their breach is a matter for the political process and public opinion, not for the 
legal process and the courts. While they have occasionally recognized the 
existence of constitutional conventions, the courts have consistently rejected 
attempts by litigants to have those conventions applied and enforced in the 
same manner as legal provisions and rules.10 In the Patriation Reference,11 the 
                                                                                                                                
Hampstead et autres c. Procureur général du Québec (June 28, 2001), Doc. No. 500-05-062072-
002 et al., (Que. S.C.), appeal now pending before the Quebec Court of Appeal. 
5
 See Potter and Hogan, supra, note 4, challenging the validity of the Constitution 
Amendment, 1997 (Quebec) and the Constitution Amendment, 1998 (Newfoundland Act), 
respectively, relating to denominational schools within each of the two provinces. 
6
 See, for example, the judicial independence cases in note 3, challenging certain 
provisions of various provincial statutes relating to the administration of justice and the 
organization of the provincial courts; and the Singh case, challenging section 39 of the Canada 
Evidence Act. 
7
 See, for example, the Samson and Brown cases, supra, note 4, challenging the Senate 
appointments process, and Lalonde, supra, note 4, challenging the directives of the Health Services 
Commission to Hôpital Montfort in Ottawa. 
8
 More precisely, the Canada Act 1982 and the Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982: vide s. 
52(2) and s. 60. 
9
 For a useful and fairly recent study in this area by a Canadian political scientist, see 
Heard, Canadian Constitutional Conventions: The Marriage of Law and Politics (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press Canada, 1991). 
10
 See, for example, Reference re Sections 26, 27 & 28 of Constitution Act, 1867, [1991] 4 
W.W.R. 97 (B.C.C.A.); LeBlanc v. Canada (1991), 80 D.L.R. (4th) 641 (Ont. C.A.); both appeal 
courts refusing to pronounce upon the existence of constitutional conventions after the appointment 
of additional Senators was an established fact. See also the decision of Riche J. at trial in Hogan v. 
Newfoundland (Attorney General) (1999), 173 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 148 (Nfld. T.D.), and most 
recently, Ontario English Catholic Teachers’ Assn. v. Ontario (Attorney General),  2001 SCC 15 
(March 8, 2001), per Iacobucci J. for the Court, paras. 63-66, upholding the decision of the Ontario 
200 Supreme Court Law Review (2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
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Supreme Court put a definitive end to the proposition that had been advanced in 
some respected academic circles that a convention, although political in origin, 
might “crystallize” into a rule of law.  
Moreover, even establishing the existence of a constitutional convention 
requires a demonstration that the putative conventional rule meets three rather 
stringent and objective criteria: there must be a precedent (or series of precedents) 
showing adherence to the rule; there must be a reason for the rule; and the rule 
must be regarded as obligatory by the political actors to whom it is said to 
apply.12 It is this third, “normative” element which the Supreme Court of Canada 
has stated is the most important of the three criteria.13 Therefore, while as a matter 
of convention, a substantial consensus amongst the provinces was required to 
patriate and amend the Constitution along the lines of the federal government‟s 
1980-1981 constitutional proposals, there was no conventional requirement that 
Quebec‟s consent was a necessary part of that consensus, or that the legislative 
assembly or Government of Quebec possessed a conventional power of veto over 
the process. 
So it was, then, that both prior to and after the enactment of the Canada Act 
198214 and the proclamation of its schedule, the Constitution Act, 1982,15 it 
could be fairly said, as the Supreme Court put it in the Patriation Reference, 
that “constitutional conventions plus constitutional law equal the total 
constitution of the country.”16 This was also the stuff of standard contemporary 
textbooks on Canadian constitutional law and political science.17 
                                                                                                                                
Court of Appeal (44 O.R. (3d) 7, at 31-32 (per curiam)), dismissing arguments in relation to 
denominational schools guarantees based on convention. 
11
 Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 at 877-83. A 
majority of the Court agreed to answer the question as to whether a constitutional convention 
requiring provincial consent existed, but distinguished conventions from rules of law: “The 
conventional rules of the constitution present one striking peculiarity. In contradistinction to the 
laws of the constitution, they are not enforced by the courts. […] This conflict between convention 
and law which prevents the courts from enforcing conventions also prevents conventions from 
crystallizing into laws, unless it be by statutory adoption” (at 880-82). 
12
 This is the test formulated by Sir W. Ivor Jennings in The Law and the Constitution, 5th 
ed. (London: University of London Press, 1959), and adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
the Patriation Reference, id., at 888. 
13
 Reference re Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] 2 
S.C.R. 793. 
14
  Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
15
  Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
16
 Patriation Reference, supra, note 11, at 883-84. Put another way, in Osborne v. Canada 
(Treasury Board), [1991] 2 S.C.R 69, at 87, per Sopinka J.: “Underlying this distinction between 
constitutional law and constitutional conventions is the contrast between legal and political 
constitutionalism.” 
17
 See, for example, Professor Peter W. Hogg‟s Constitutional Law of Canada, student ed. 
(Toronto: Carswell Co., 1977), in which he divided the first chapter (“Sources”) of the first part 
(2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d)     The Role of Constitutional Principles 201 
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II. THE NEW EMPHASIS ON CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES  
With the Provincial Judges Reference and the Quebec Secession Reference, 
suddenly (it seemed), “constitutional principles” had replaced “constitutional 
conventions” as the most prominent and important feature of the “unwritten 
constitution.” These principles were said to be “not merely descriptive,” but 
rather, “invested with a powerful normative force” and “binding upon both 
courts and governments.”18 Their role was not only to interpret the existing 
terms of the Constitution, but also to be employed, as an innovative tool of 
constitutional dentistry, in the “filling of gaps” (and apparently, the adding of 
more teeth) in “the express terms of the constitutional text.”19 Moreover, 
establishing these principles did not first require proof that they conformed to 
the rigorous set of criteria that applied to determining the existence of 
constitutional conventions. The existence of constitutional principles was 
largely self-evident. 
It did not take the proverbial rocket scientist (or, to modernize the metaphor, 
a web page designer) to realize that a whole new vista of legal argument had 
just opened up. All it took was a score of reasonably imaginative litigation 
lawyers. Within the days,20 weeks and months following the release of the 
Quebec Secession Reference opinion, new or revised statements of claim and 
defences were filed, challenging or resisting the application of various 
constitutional instruments, ordinary statutes and administrative action. If there 
                                                                                                                                
(“Basic Concepts”) of his book into five sub-chapters: “The „Constitution‟”; “Imperial Statutes”; 
“Canadian Statutes;” “Caselaw;” and “Conventions.” Professor J. Mallory in The Structure of 
Canadian Government (Toronto: Gage Publishing, 1971) placed heavy emphasis on the role of 
conventions in the opening pages of the first part (“The Pattern of the Constitution”) of his book (at 
2): “The Canadian constitution is a product of negotiation and bargaining, of a feeling that the 
practical operation is more important than the letter of the law, and that the spirit supersedes the 
letter of the agreement. This has made our constitutional law harder to discover and apply than the 
American, for it shares the ambiguities of the British constitution. The difference between 
American and British constitutionalism is essentially this: for the Americans, anything 
unconstitutional is illegal, however right and necessary it may seem; for the British, anything 
unconstitutional is wrong, however legal it may be.” See too, Dawson, The Government of Canada, 
4th ed., revised by N. Ward (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 1963), Chapter 4, “The Nature 
of the Constitution” (at 63-64): “the unwritten constitution is every whit as important as the British 
North America Act, and indeed, [...] much of the latter is transformed and made almost 
unrecognizable by the operation of the former, which in all these instances consists of established 
customs and usages which have grown up over a long period of years.”  
18
 Quebec Secession Reference, supra, note 2, at para. 54. 
19
 Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 104. 
20
 The Supreme Court‟s opinion in the Quebec Secession Reference was rendered on 
August 20, 1998. The challenge to the Senate appointments process in the Samson case was 
brought almost immediately, and the application for an interlocutory injunction was heard and 
decided on September 1, 1998. 
202 Supreme Court Law Review (2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
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was no tangible support in the words of the textual provisions, or if a 
constitutional convention could not easily be proved (and in any event, could 
not be enforced at law), the answer for counsel appeared to be obvious: appeal 
to principle! 
In the Provincial Judges Reference, the former Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court concluded that constitutional principles stride in majestically through the 
preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867:21 “the grand entrance hall to the castle 
of the Constitution.”22 In certain cases, however, one was tempted to wonder if 
their invocation amounted to a concerted effort to slip in through the back door 
that which could not be accomplished through straightforward judicial 
interpretation of existing textual provisions. Some over-worked governmental 
lawyers — already tasked, for example, with developing detailed evidentiary 
justification for legislative and governmental action under section 1 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,23 and with fully grasping the scope 
of governmental fiduciary obligations under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982 — might perhaps be forgiven if they were to have looked upon these new 
developments with a doleful and jaundiced eye, and to predict that 
constitutional principles would soon become the last refuge of the scoundrel.24 
________________________________________________________________ 
21
  Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. 
22
 Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 109, per Lamer C.J., for the 
majority; but see La Forest J.‟s striking dissent, discussed later in this paper. 
23
  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11. 
24
 Here, I am paraphrasing Samuel Johnson‟s observation on patriotism. It appears that at 
least one other commentator has also been drawn to Johnson‟s remark in a not entirely dissimilar 
context; viz.: “Dr. Johnson was, of course, only partly right. Patriotism can also be noble. But it is 
an aphorism worth remembering when we celebrate constitutional patriotism, national or 
transnational, and rush to its defence from any challenges to it. How, then, do we both respect and 
uphold all that is good in our constitutional tradition and yet, at the same time, keep it and ourselves 
under sceptical check?” (Weiler, “Federalism and Constitutionalism: Europe‟s Sonderweg,” 
Harvard Law School Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 10/00, 2000; the final version of this paper 
will be published in Nicolaidis and Howse (eds.), The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of 
Governance in the United States and the European Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001)). For some trenchant critical analysis of (and a sceptical check upon) the use of constitutional 
principles in the New Brunswick Broadcasting case and the Provincial Court Judges and Quebec 
Secession references, respectively, see, notably, Leclair and Morrissette, “L‟indépendance 
judiciaire et la Cour suprême: reconstruction historique douteuse et théorie constitutionnelle de 
complaisance” (1998), 36 Osgoode Hall L.J. 485; Goldsworthy, “The Preamble, Judicial 
Independence and Judicial Integrity” (2000), 11:2 Constitutional Forum 60; Hurlburt, “Fairy Tales 
and Living Trees: Observations on Some Recent Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of 
Canada” (1999), 26:2 Manitoba L.J. 181; Hogg, “The Secession Reference: The Duty to Negotiate” 
(1998 Constitutional Cases Conference, Osgoode Hall Law School, 16 April 1999), reproduced in 
(1999), 7:1-2 Canada Watch 1; Monahan, “The Public Policy Role of the Supreme Court of Canada 
in the Secession Reference” (1999), 11 N.J.C.L. 65. Nota bene: Two new and important analyses of 
(2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d)     The Role of Constitutional Principles 203 
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III. THE VITAL ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
This, however, is at best only one side of the story (even for the law officers 
of the Crown). First, it must be recognized that by whatever route they may 
have entered, constitutional principles have taken up residence and are here to 
stay. Indeed, a careful reading of the jurisprudence25 shows that they have 
always been with us, even if their role had never heretofore been quite as fully 
articulated and developed as in the Provincial Judges Reference and the 
Quebec Secession Reference. Second, like constitutional conventions, which 
themselves are grounded in principle,26 constitutional principles reflect the 
wisdom that comes with an appreciation of the constitutional values that imbue 
the constitutional text. “[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are 
expounding,” thundered Chief Justice Marshall of the American Supreme 
Court.27 Judicious resort to constitutional principles helps to diminish the 
rigidity and inflexibility of thought that might otherwise dominate and stifle the 
characterization of the written text, itself amenable to formal amendment only 
by a series of procedures that are, at the best of times, difficult to operate. 
                                                                                                                                
the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on constitutional principles have been published since I 
drafted and presented this paper: see Elliott, “References, Structural Argumentation and the 
Organizing Principles of Canada‟s Constitution” (2001), 80 Can. Bar Rev. 67; Walters, “The 
Common Law Constitution in Canada: Return of Lex Non Scripta as Fundamental Law” (2001), 51 
U.T.L.J. 91. 
25
 As Riddell J. of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Ontario aptly observed 
in Bell v. Town of Burlington, (1915), 34 O.L.R. 619, at  622, “In our usage, that is unconstitutional 
which is opposed to the principles, more or less vaguely and generally stated, upon which we think 
the people should be governed.” See, for example, the early judgments of the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council on the operation of various facets of the federal principle in construing the 
distribution of legislative powers in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and the pre-
Charter dicta in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada inferring principles of freedom 
of expression and the rule of law from the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 and the British 
constitutional tradition. The key decisions of the Privy Council may be found most conveniently in 
the three-volume collection prepared by Richard Olmsted, Q.C., of the Department of Justice, 
Canadian Constitutional Decisions of the Judicial Committee (short title), (Ottawa: Queen‟s 
Printer, 1954). The key principles emanating from the case law of the Supreme Court of Canada 
from 1949 (when it truly became “supreme” with the abolition of new appeals to the Privy Council) 
have been very usefully set out by my colleague Louis B.Z. Davis, Canadian Constitutional Law 
Handbook: Leading Statements, Principles and Precedents (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1985).  
26
 To take but one example, in the Patriation Reference, supra, note 11, at 880 and 888, 
the “constitutional value” said to be the “pivot” for the conventions of responsible government “is 
the democratic principle”; and the “reason for the rule” of substantial provincial consent to the 
proposed constitutional amendment “is the federal principle” (at 905). In other words, first 
principles are logically prior to (and at least in this case, a condition precedent for) the 
establishment of constitutional conventions.  
27
 McCulloch v. State of Maryland et al., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), at 407 (emphasis 
in original). 
204 Supreme Court Law Review (2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
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Constitutional principles, as our own Supreme Court has rightly stated, 
“emerge from an understanding of the constitutional text itself, the historical 
context, and previous judicial interpretations of constitutional meaning.”28 At 
the same time, as the Court has also emphasized, the existence of constitutional 
principles must not be taken as an invitation to supersede or otherwise to 
dispense with the primacy of the written text. To do so would be to put into 
question the role of the courts and the legitimacy of constitutional review,29 the 
power of review being judicial rather than legislative in character. 
Constitutional principles, unlike constitutional conventions, can be employed 
to interpret and apply constitutional and legislative provisions. Constitutional 
principles are “binding upon both courts and governments” essentially because 
the application of these principles to the interpretation of constitutional and 
legislative texts results in a judicial pronouncement on the scope and 
application of the law itself.30 This is different from saying that these principles 
are themselves law, in the sense that they can be simply substituted for 
constitutional provisions that have been promulgated as part of the text of the 
supreme law. The very nature of unwritten principles — their judicial and 
jurisprudential origin, their broad scope and the flexibility that they bring to the 
interpretation of the constitutional instrument — makes it inappropriate to 
assimilate them, in absolute terms and without nuance or distinction, to the role 
and function of provisions having direct force of law.  
Constitutional principles in structural terms (Chief Justice Lamer‟s “castle”) 
may be seen, then, as “foundational,” forming part of the “internal architecture” 
of the Constitution.31 In dynamic terms (Lord Sankey‟s “living tree”32), they 
“breathe life” into the Constitution; they are “its lifeblood.” Constitutional 
principles perform a vital role in construing and applying the provisions of the 
Constitution of Canada. The challenge is to ensure that they are employed in a 
balanced and stable fashion so that the edifice is supported and not weakened 
________________________________________________________________ 
28
 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 32. 
29
 Id., at para. 53, and Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of 
Prince Edward Island; Reference re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Provincial 
Court of Prince Edward Island; R. v. Campbell; R. v. Ekmecic; R. v. Wickman; Manitoba 
Provincial Court Judges Assn. v. Manitoba (Minister of Justice), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 93. 
These concerns are discussed later in this paper. 
30
 The doctrine of precedent (i.e., stare decisis), judicial comity and the hierarchy of the 
court structure itself ultimately ensures — to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the 
circumstances of a given judicial decision — the binding character of the judicial pronouncement 
on other courts or levels of court. 
31
 Quebec Secession Reference, supra¸ note 28, at paras. 49 and 50. 
32
 Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.); Quebec Secession 
Reference, supra, note 28, at paras. 50, 51 and 52. 
(2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d)     The Role of Constitutional Principles 205 
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from within, and to ensure that their growth is kept within “natural limits”33 so 
that they do not overtake and eventually strangle the organism itself. 
IV. “WRITTEN” AND “UNWRITTEN” CONSTITUTIONS 
In point of fact, our courts have long recognized an important role for 
constitutional principles in deducing the meaning of the constitutional text. This 
is all the more the case because our written Constitution — to the untutored 
mind, boggling in its level of detail and concern with minutiae34 — is in many 
respects less a blueprint for constitutional government than it is a preliminary 
sketch of some of its broad lines. This is due in large part to our British 
constitutional tradition. The preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 recalled 
that heritage and carried it forward into the new Dominion:  
 
Whereas the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick have 
expressed their Desire to be federally united into One Dominion under the Crown 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar in 
Principle to that of the United Kingdom … [Emphasis added.]35 
It is a truism that the British constitution is largely an “unwritten” one, in that 
while there are a series of seminal instruments stretching back to at least the 
Magna Carta,36 there is no unified, organic, comprehensive and authoritative 
statement expressly declaring the fundamental principles, postulates, powers 
________________________________________________________________ 
33
 Edwards, supra, note 32, at 136: “The British North America Act planted in Canada a 
living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits.” 
34
 The usual (and convenient, as it is succinctly worded) example is head 9 of the 
enumerated heads of federal legislative power in section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867: 
“Beacons, Buoys, Lighthouses and Sable Island.” More prolix examples abound, both in the Act of 
1867 and the Constitution Act, 1982, as well as in the series of other statutes, orders and related 
instruments that make up the written Constitution. 
35
 The late Senator Eugene Forsey, a lifelong scholar of the Constitution, insisted (at 182) 
in his memoirs, A Life on the Fringe (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1990), that the phrase, “a 
Constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom,” meant simply the principles of 
responsible government. “The Quebec resolutions had said that the executive government was to be 
vested in the Queen, to be exercised by Her Majesty personally, or by her representative duly 
authorized, „according to the well understood principles of the British Constitution‟. The phrase in 
the preamble to the Act was simply the Colonial Office legalese for what the Fathers had proposed. 
It had nothing to do with the Bill of Rights or the Habeas Corpus Act. Those enactments became 
part of the law of Canada by virtue of the reception of the English law in various parts of Canada 
long before Confederation. There is no ground whatever for dragging them in by any preambular 
back door.”  
36
 The aforementioned Bill of Rights, the Act of Settlement and the Habeas Corpus Acts 
immediately spring to mind. One of the best collections is to be found in Stephenson and Marchem, 
eds., Sources of English Constitutional History: A Selection of Documents from A.D. 600 to the 
Interregnum, revised ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).  
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and jurisdictions underlying British constitutional government. This is said to 
be in contradistinction to the constitutions of the American and French 
Republics, to take the most obvious examples.37  
V. JOHN MARSHALL AND THE PRINCIPLE OF  
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
However, even a written constitution in the American style must be subject 
to elucidation. To return to the words of Chief Justice Marshall: 
 
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its 
great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into 
execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be 
embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the 
public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, 
its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those 
objects be deduced by the nature of the objects themselves. That this idea was 
entertained by the framers of the American constitution, is not only to be inferred 
from the nature of the instrument, but from the language.38 
 
Some 16 years earlier, by sheer parity of reasoning, Marshall had established 
the proposition that the Supreme Court of the United States was mandated by 
the Constitution to review the validity of Acts of Congress, although the written 
text contained nary a word on judicial review of the constitutionality of laws. 
Marshall‟s proposition flowed from first principles, the nature and logic of 
constitutionalism itself and the role of the judicial power.39 His classic 
exposition in Marbury v. Madison is reproduced below in extenso:  
________________________________________________________________ 
37
 And putting aside the question of constitutional conventions, which, as we have seen, 
and as Professor A.V. Dicey maintained (at 28) in his classic text, An Introduction to the Study of 
the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London: MacMillan, 1959), are not part of constitutional law, 
written or unwritten: “The distinction, in short, between written and unwritten law does not in any 
sense square with the distinction between the law of the constitution (constitutional law properly so 
called) and the conventions of the constitution.” 
38
 McCulloch v. State of Maryland et al., supra, note 27, at 407. 
39
 Some powerful contemporaneous doctrinal support for this proposition may be found in 
The Federalist No. 78 drafted by Alexander Hamilton and published in the second volume of the 
collected Federalist Papers in 1788. Hamilton wrote:  
There is no position which depends on clearer principles than that every act of a delegated 
authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No 
legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this would be to 
affirm [...] that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only what their powers do not 
authorize, but what they forbid. [...] the courts were designed to be an intermediate body 
between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within 
the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar 
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The question whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of 
the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United States; but, happily, not of an 
intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems only necessary to recognize certain 
principles, supposed to have been long and well-established, to decide it. 
That the people have the right to establish, for their future government, such 
principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the 
basis, on which the whole American fabric has been erected. […] The principles, 
therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. […] 
[…] The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits 
may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. […] It is a 
proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative 
act repugnant to it; or that the legislature may alter the constitution by ordinary act. 
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a 
superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with 
ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall 
please to alter it. 
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the 
constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are 
absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power, in its own nature 
illimitable. 
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as 
forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the 
theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant 
to the constitution, is void. 
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is consequently to 
be considered, by this court, as one of the fundamental principles of our society. 
[…] 
If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, 
notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect? Or, 
in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it 
was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory […] 
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the 
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and 
                                                                                                                                
province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a 
fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning 
of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an 
irreconcilable difference variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and 
validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or in other words, the Constitution ought to be 
preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents. 
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interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on 
the operation of each. 
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution 
apply to a particular case, so that the court must decide that case conformably to the 
law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding 
the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. 
This is the very essence of judicial duty. 
If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to 
any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, 
must govern the case to which they both apply.40 
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY IN CANADA 
In Canada, the supremacy of the written constitution originally flowed from 
the fact that the British North America Act of 186741 was an Imperial statute 
extending to the colonial dominion. By the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 
1865,42 any colonial law that was “repugnant to the Provisions” of any imperial 
statute “extending to the colony” was “absolutely void and inoperative” to the 
extent of the repugnancy. Although the Colonial Laws Validity Act was 
repealed in its application to the dominions by the Statute of Westminster43 in 
1931, at the request of Canada, section 7(1) of the statute preserved the pre-
eminent position of the British North America Acts, 1867 to 1930. If Parliament 
or a provincial legislature enacted a law that was ultra vires the legislative 
authority of the enacting legislative body, then the repugnancy of the impugned 
law with the British North America Act would result in a judicial declaration 
that the law was void and inoperative. 
With the patriation of the Constitution by operation of the Canada Act 1982, 
the supremacy clause of the Constitution is now set out in the first subsection of 
section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, in the following terms: 
 
52. (1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that 
is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, of no force or effect. 
 
Textual authority for constitutional judicial review in Canada now reposes, 
therefore, in section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.  
________________________________________________________________ 
40
 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), at 176-78. [Emphasis added.] 
41
  1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, now styled the Constitution Act, 1867. 
42
  1865 (U.K.), 28 & 29 Vict., c. 63. 
43
  1931 (U.K.), 22 Geo. V, c. 4. 
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VII. THE TRIUMPH OF CONSTITUTIONALISM,  
THE RULE OF LAW AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS  
1. The Manitoba Language Rights Reference 
An illustration of the operation of the principle of consti-tutionalism at the 
heart of section 52 may be instructive. In the Manitoba Language Rights 
Reference,44 the Supreme Court of Canada was faced with the difficult task of 
declaring invalid almost 90 years of legislation enacted solely in English by the 
legislature of Manitoba, in contravention of section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 
1870,45 which requires the enactment, printing and publication of the Acts of 
the legislature in English and in French. The difficulty arose principally from 
the fact that a judicial declaration of invalidity of this magnitude threatened to 
leave the province without any current laws or even a functioning legislature, 
the members of the legislative assembly having themselves been elected and 
the legislature summoned on the basis of unilingual, and hence invalid, 
legislation. 
The Supreme Court did not shrink from its constitutional duty. The 
requirement of bilingual enactment was mandatory. The purpose — the 
constitutional value — behind both section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 and 
section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the Court stated, “was to ensure full 
and equal access to the legislatures, the laws and the courts for francophones 
and anglophones alike.”46 These fundamental guarantees “would be 
meaningless and their entrenchment a futile exercise were they not 
obligatory.”47 Section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 imposed a constitutional 
duty on the legislature of the province with regard to the manner and form of its 
legislation, and this duty protected “the substantive rights of all Manitobans to 
equal access to the law”48 in English and in French. That constitutional duty, 
the Court said, conferred upon the judiciary “the responsibility of protecting the 
correlative language rights of all Manitobans including the Franco-Manitoban 
minority.”49  
 
The judiciary is the institution charged with the duty of ensuring that the 
government complies with the Constitution. We must protect those whose 
________________________________________________________________ 
44
 Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721; per curiam. I was one of counsel in 
this matter. 
45
  33 Vict., c. 3 (Can.). 
46
 Supra, note 44, at 739. 
47
  Id. 
48
  Id., at 744. 
49
  Id., at 744-45. 
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constitutional rights have been violated, whomever they may be, and whatever the 
reasons for the violation.50 
 
On a more general plane, the Court then went on to make an eloquent 
philosophical comment about constitutionalism and the role of constitutional 
judicial review in Canada. 
 
The Constitution of a country is a statement of the will of the people to be governed 
in accordance with certain principles held as fundamental and certain prescriptions 
restrictive of the powers of the legislature and government. It is, as s. 52 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 declares, the “supreme law” of the nation, unalterable by the 
normal legislative process, and unsuffering of laws inconsistent with it. The duty of 
the judiciary is to interpret and apply the laws of Canada and each of the 
provinces, and it is thus our duty to ensure that the constitutional law prevails.51 
 
“Since April 17, 1982,” the Court noted, “the mandate of the judiciary to 
protect the Constitution has been embodied in s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 
1982.”52 The Court reviewed the consequences of failure to comply with the 
terms of the Constitution prior to 1982, under the jurisprudence developed 
pursuant to the Colonial Laws Validity Act, and concluded: 
 
Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 does not alter the principles which have 
provided the foundation for judicial review over the years. In a case where 
constitutional manner and form requirements have not been complied with, the 
consequence of such non-compliance continues to be invalidity. The words “of no 
force or effect” mean that a law thus inconsistent with the Constitution has no force 
or effect because it is invalid.53 
 
The Court next turned to an examination of the principle of the rule of law, 
“a fundamental principle of our Constitution.”54 Because the rule of law means 
that the law is supreme over government and is, therefore, “preclusive of the 
influence of arbitrary power,”55 it is this supremacy of the law, as embodied in 
both section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 and section 52 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, that required the Court to “find the unconstitutional laws of 
Manitoba to be invalid and of no force and effect.”56 However, the notion of the 
rule of law also carries with it a second, broader meaning: “the rule of law 
________________________________________________________________ 
50
 Id., at 745. [Emphasis added.] 
51
 Id. [Emphasis added.] 
52
  Id., at 745-46. 
53
 Id., at 746. [Emphasis added.] 
54
  Id., at 748. 
55
  Id. 
56
 Id., at 749. 
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requires the creation and maintenance of an actual order of positive laws which 
preserves and embodies the more general principle of normative order.”57 
It was because of concern for this “second aspect of the rule of law” that the 
Court was obliged to consider further the role of this principle. The Court 
determined that the rule of law, so clearly a pillar of the English Constitution,58 
had become “a postulate of our own constitutional order”59 through its implicit 
incorporation in the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 and its explicit 
mention in Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, the preamble to the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which declares: 
 
Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God 
and the rule of law: [Emphasis added.] 
 
Beyond this, however, the Court underlined that the principle of the rule of 
law “is clearly implicit in the very nature of a Constitution.”60 
 
The Constitution, as the Supreme Law, must be understood as a purposive ordering 
of social relations providing a basis upon which an actual order of positive laws can 
be brought into existence. The founders of this nation must have intended, as one of 
the basic principles of nation building, that Canada be a society of legal order and 
normative structure: one governed by rule of law. While this is not set out in a 
specific provision, the principle of the rule of law is clearly a principle of our 
Constitution. 
 
The Court cannot take a narrow and literal approach to constitutional 
interpretation. The jurisprudence of the Court evidences a willingness to 
supplement textual analysis with historical, contextual and purposive interpretation 
in order to ascertain the intent of the makers of our Constitution.61 
 
The Court analyzed its earlier opinion in the Patriation Reference, in which 
the principle of federalism had figured prominently in the majority‟s reasoning 
as to the existence of a constitutional convention governing the degree of 
consensus needed amongst federal and provincial actors to proceed with the 
federal government‟s constitutional amendment resolution. “In other words,” 
the Court stated, “in the process of Constitutional adjudication, the Court may 





 Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London: 
MacMillan, 1959), especially Chapter IV, “The Rule of Law: Its Nature and General Applications” 
(at 183-205). 
59
  Re Manitoba Language Rights, supra, note 44, at 750. 
60
  Id. 
61
 Id., at 750-51. [Emphasis added.] 
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Constitution in Canada. In the case of the Patriation Reference, supra, this 
unwritten postulate was the principle of federalism. In the present case it is the 
principle of rule of law.”62 
The Court stated that because of the legislature of Manitoba‟s “persistent 
violation of the constitutional dictates”63 of section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 
1870, “the Province of Manitoba is in a state of emergency”:64 all unilingual 
Acts of the legislature “are and always have been invalid and of no force or 
effect.”65 However, because the Constitution “will not suffer a province without 
laws,”66 temporary validity and force would be given to the current Acts of the 
legislature for “the minimum period necessary for translation, re-enactment, 
printing and publishing of the unilingual Acts”67 in both languages. For any and 
all future enactments, “the Constitution requires that, from the date of this 
judgment, all new Acts of the Manitoba Legislature be enacted, printed and 
published in both French and English. Any Acts of the Legislature that do not 
meet this requirement will be invalid and of no force or effect.”68 
________________________________________________________________ 
62
 Id., at 752. Tellingly, in its analysis, the Court underscored a passage by Martland and 
Ritchie JJ., who dissented in the Patriation Reference in that they would have found that provincial 
consent to the patriation package was not only a requirement of constitutional convention but also 
of constitutional law. Martland and Ritchie concluded that in the important series of cases in which 
“judicially developed legal principles and doctrines” had been shaped, none of those principles is to 
be found in the express provisions of the Constitution, and “they have been accorded full legal 
force in the sense of being employed to strike down legislative enactments” (at 752 of the Manitoba 
Language Rights Reference, citing the Patriation Reference). This characterization of the principles 
as having “full legal force” was cited by the Court again in the Quebec Secession Reference for the 
proposition that underlying constitutional principles “may in certain circumstances give rise to 
substantive legal obligations” (at para. 54).  Professor Hogg (“The Secession Reference: The Duty 
to Negotiate” (1998 Constitutional Cases Conference, Osgoode Hall Law School, 16 April 1999), at 
33-34) has chided the Court for incorporating into the “law of Canada” an obligation to negotiate 
secession on the basis of the “vague principles of democracy and federalism,” and thus converting 
“political reality into a legal rule.” He adds that “it is not entirely clear why it is a legal rule, since it 
appears to have no legal sanctions.” However, this simply begs the question: is it truly a legal rule? 
Although the duty to negotiate established by the Court in the Quebec Secession Reference (in my 
view, on the basis of section 46 of the Constitution Act, 1982 construed in light of the democratic 
principle) is characterized by the Court as a “constitutional obligation,” and would certainly have 
“powerful normative force,” the Court stopped shy of calling it a legal obligation. The duty shares 
some of the characteristics of a constitutional convention in that it is a binding obligation in the 
political and constitutional sense, but it appears not to be enforceable as such by the courts as a 
matter of law: vide paras. 98-102 of the Court‟s opinion. 
63
  Re Manitoba Language Rights, supra, note 44, at 766. 
64
  Id. 
65
  Id., at 767. 
66
  Id. 
67
  Id., at 768-69. 
68
 Id., at 768.  
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2. The Quebec Secession Reference 
There is no doubt that the Court‟s approach and reasoning in the Manitoba 
Language Rights Reference was highly germane to its disposition of the 
Quebec Secession Reference. It was no coincidence that the Court chose to 
preface the Quebec Secession Reference with its opening words in the 
Manitoba Language Rights Reference: 
 
This Reference combines legal and constitutional questions of the utmost subtlety 
and complexity with political questions of great sensitivity.69 
 
In the Quebec Secession Reference, the Court rejected the argument 
advanced by the amicus curiae that a constitutional principle of effectivity 
could be established both through the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 
and through the second aspect of the constitutional principle of the rule of law 
that had allowed the Court to avoid a legal vacuum in Manitoba. In other 
words, this putative principle of effectivity would be there to fill the gap in the 
constitutional structure that would be created by the unilateral secession of the 
province. The similarity between the principle of the rule of law and the 
principle of effectivity, it had been argued, was that “both attempt to refashion 
the law to meet social reality.”70 But effectivity could not be taken as anything 
more than a possible state of fact; cast as a legal principle, it would run 
“contrary to the rule of law” in that it would amount to nothing more than “the 
contention that the law may be broken as long as it can be broken 
successfully.”71 This would be inimical to — indeed, the antithesis of — the 
principle of constitutionalism itself, the “essence” of which, the Court had said, 
was “embodied” in section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.72 
________________________________________________________________ 
69
 Id., at 728. These words were also employed by counsel for the Attorney General of 
Canada to commence oral argument in the Quebec Secession Reference. For analysis of the 
Reference from the perspective of federal counsel, see generally Bienvenu, “Secession by 
Constitutional Means: The Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession 
Reference” (New Zealand Law Conference, Rotorua, April 1999); Dawson, “Reflections on the 
Opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference” (1999), 11 N.J.C.L. 
5; and Newman, The Quebec Secession Reference: The Rule of Law and the Position of the 
Attorney General of Canada (Toronto: York University Centre for Public Law and Public Policy, 
1999). It is fair to say that counsel who represented the federal government in the reference, like 
most commentators and observers, were highly impressed with the clarity and cogency of the 
Court‟s reasoning in this pivotally important matter. In the latter book, I wrote that the ruling was 
remarkably compelling in its wisdom and that the Court has been justly praised for its profoundly 
intelligent and masterful handling of the issues. 
70
 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 145. 
71
 Id., at para. 108. 
72
 Id., at para. 72. 
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The Court took great care to emphasize that what was done in the Manitoba 
Language Rights Reference was done in pursuance of the constitutionalism 
principle embodied in section 52: 
 
[N]othing of our concern in the Manitoba Language Rights Reference about the 
severe practical consequences of unconstitutionality affected our conclusion that, as 
a matter of law, all Manitoba legislation at issue in that case was unconstitutional. 
The Court‟s declaration of unconstitutionality was clear and unambiguous. The 
Court‟s concern with maintenance of the rule of law was directed in its relevant 
aspect to the appropriate remedy, which in that case was to suspend the declaration 
of invalidity to permit appropriate rectification to take place.73 
VIII. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND  
THE FABRIC OF THE CONSTITUTION 
Constitutional principles, then, can be employed in furtherance of the 
provisions of the Constitution. Seen in this light, it is not so much that they “fill 
gaps,” but rather that they extend the threads of the existing fabric of the 
Constitution in circumstances where the principles are tightly interwoven with 
the meaning of the textual provisions themselves. Deftly handled, they can 
perform an important (and in some cases, essential) role in bringing the terms 
of the Constitution to life and in allowing it to respond to unforeseen situations 
in a way that maintains the normative order, federal structure and democratic 
character of our constitutional system, while, as in the Manitoba Language 
Rights Reference, keeping faith with the protection of minorities. 
This is also consistent with the approach that our Supreme Court signalled it 
would be adopting in the earliest cases under the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. “Narrow and technical interpretation, if not modulated by a 
sense of the unknowns of the future, can stunt the growth of the law and hence 
the community it serves.”74 An entrenched bill of rights like the Charter calls 
for a “broad, purposive analysis, which interprets specific provisions of a 
constitutional document in the light of its larger objects” and which avoids 
what has been called “the austerity of tabulated legalism.”75 Chief Justice 
Dickson‟s words in Hunter v. Southam echoed those of Chief Justice Marshall 
________________________________________________________________ 
73
 Id., at para. 145. 
74
 Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinger, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, at 366, per Estey J., 
“[The Charter] cannot be readily amended. The fine and constant adjustment process of these 
constitutional provisions is left by a tradition of necessity to the judicial branch. Flexibility must be 
balanced with certainty.”  
75
 Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 156, per Dickson J. (as he then was). 
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almost two centuries earlier.76 We must never forget that we are expounding a 
constitution. Constitutional principles play an essential role in that exposition, 
balancing the constitutional text with constitutional meaning.  
IX. PRINCIPLES IN THE BALANCE 
The principles of judicial independence, federalism, the rule of law and the 
protection of minorities are quite familiar to constitutional lawyers, and their 
textual and jurisprudential bases have been well-canvassed in the Provincial 
Judges Reference and the Quebec Secession Reference. It should be mentioned, 
however, that those are clearly not the only basic principles of the Constitution, 
nor the sole rules of constitutional interpretation.77 Other key principles and 
values include the principle of parliamentary sovereignty78 (which, although 
________________________________________________________________ 
76
 Id., at 155: “The task of expounding a constitution is crucially different from that of 
construing a statute. [...] Its function is to provide a continuing framework for the legitimate 
exercise of governmental power and, when joined by a Bill or a Charter of Rights, for the 
unremitting protection of individual rights and liberties. Once enacted, its provisions cannot easily 
be repealed or amended. It must, therefore, be capable of growth and development over time to 
meet new social, political and historical realities often unimagined by its framers. The judiciary is 
the guardian of the constitution and must, in interpreting its provisions, bear these considerations in 
mind.” [Emphasis added.]  
77
 There is an unfortunate tendency in some of the recent decisions of the lower courts to 
speak of federalism, democracy, the rule of law and constitutionalism, and the protection of 
minorities as the four basic pillars of the Constitution. While these principles are certainly 
foundational or structural (the Quebec Secession Reference opinion calls them “fundamental and 
organizing principles”), the Supreme Court was quite clear in emphasizing that these principles 
were those that were “relevant to addressing the question before us,” and that “this enumeration is 
by no means exhaustive” (para. 32 of the Court‟s opinion in the Quebec Secession Reference). 
78
 “By way of contrast [to the determination of issues relating to justiciability in the 
Charter context], in the residual area reserved for the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty in 
Canadian constitutional law, it is Parliament and the legislatures, not the courts, that have ultimate 
constitutional authority to draw the boundaries. It is the prerogative of a sovereign Parliament to 
make its intention known as to the role the courts are to play in interpreting, applying and enforcing 
its statutes. [...] That the executive through its control of a House of Commons majority may in 
practice dictate the position the House of Commons takes on the scope of Parliament‟s auditing 
function is not [...] constitutionally cognizable by the judiciary. The grundnorm with which the 
courts must work in this context is that of the sovereignty of Parliament. The ministers of the 
Crown hold office with the grace of the House of Commons and any position taken by the majority 
must be taken to reflect the sovereign will of Parliament. Where Parliament has indicated in the 
Auditor General Act that it wishes its own servant to report to it on denials of access to information 
needed to carry out his functions on Parliament‟s behalf, it would not be appropriate for this Court 
to consider granting remedies for such denials, if they, in fact, exist” (Canada (Auditor General) v. 
Canada (Minister of Energy, Mines & Resources), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 49, at 91, 103-04), per Dickson 
C. J. for the Court. See also Reference re Canada Assistance Plan (British Columbia), [1991] 2 
S.C.R. 525. 
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attenuated by the limits on federal and provincial legislative power imposed by 
the provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, remains an 
essential feature of our constitutional structure); parliamentary privileges; 
constitutional conventions relating to the principles of responsible government, 
including the convention of political neutrality of the public service;79 certain 
doctrines flowing from the federal principle, such as the paramountcy doctrine; 
important common law and administrative law rules relating variously to the 
Crown prerogative, due process, natural justice and procedural fairness; and the 
basic precepts and underlying tenets of most of the provisions now entrenched 
in the Charter of Rights itself.80 
In the Quebec Secession Reference, the Court recognized the need to balance 
the principles at play in that case. “These defining principles,” the Court 
affirmed, “function in symbiosis. No single principle can be defined in isolation 
from the others, nor does any one principle trump or exclude the operation of 
any other.”81 This balancing of principles has raised concerns in some quarters 
because, as Professor Patrick Monahan has put it, a “judicial balancing” theory 
seems at odds with the traditional role of judicial interpretation of existing text, 
________________________________________________________________ 
79
 OPSEU v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2; Osborne v. Canada (Treasury 
Board), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 69.  
80
 As regards the Charter, the principles and values underlying basic liberties such as 
freedom of conscience and religion; freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression; peaceful 
assembly and association in section 2; democracy and representative government in sections 3 to 5; 
citizenship and freedom of movement in section 6; principles of fundamental justice in section 7; 
due process and protections relating to search and seizure, arrest, detention and imprisonment, as 
well as other common law principles relating to criminal and penal matters in sections 8 to 14; not 
only formal but also substantive equality before and under the law and the right to equal protection 
and benefit of the law without discrimination in section 15; formal and substantive equality in 
relation to the official languages of Canada in sections 16 to 23 and the principle of advancement of 
equality in section 16(3); the right to a just and appropriate, court-ordered remedy under section 24; 
recognition of the interplay between the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter and those of 
the aboriginal peoples of Canada in section 25; other rights and freedoms in section 26; the 
multicultural heritage of Canadians in section 27; equality of the sexes in section 28; and rights 
respecting denominational schools in section 29, respectively. All of the rights and freedoms set out 
in the Charter are expressed in section 1 as being guaranteed “subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” In discussing 
section 1 of the Charter in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at 136, Dickson C.J. stated:  
The Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a free and democratic 
society which I believe embody, to name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of 
beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions 
which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society. The underlying values 
and principles of a free and democratic society are the genesis of the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the Charter and the ultimate standard against which a limit on a right or 
freedom must be shown, despite its effect, to be reasonable and demonstrably justified. 
81
 Quebec Secession Reference, supra, note 70, at para. 49. 
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in that the former “asks the judiciary to balance for themselves underlying 
constitutional values and to choose the balance that they believe most 
appropriate.” This, he continues, “fails to distinguish the interpretation of text 
from its creation” and puts the courts in the role of constitutional drafters. It 
may be, states Professor Monahan, not implausibly, that the constitutional text 
itself invites the courts in certain cases to ascribe a higher value, or primacy, to 
certain norms and principles as reflected in the written provisions themselves, 
and that the role of the courts in such circumstances is not to choose a different 
balance but to give effect to the underlying logic of the text.82 To what extent, 
for example, can the principle of the rule of law and the supremacy of the 
provisions of the Constitution, as declared in section 52(1) of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, be “balanced” without saying, in effect, that the Constitution‟s 
supremacy is not absolute? A relativist view of constitutional supremacy might 
risk undermining the very object of a written constitution (and 
constitutionalism itself): to prescribe the basic rules of government in a superior 
and paramount law. It could become a very slippery slope, indeed, and would 
raise difficult questions about the role of the courts and the legitimacy of 
judicial review. 
In a subsequent piece,83 Professor Monahan suggests that a “necessary 
implication” approach to unwritten principles, as evidenced notably by the 
reasoning of the Newfoundland Court of Appeal in the Hogan case,84 could 
point to a more prudent path, on the theory that the courts would be permitted 
to have regard to unwritten constitutional principles “only where such 
principles are necessarily implied by the constitutional text”: 
 
Implicit principles are those that flow logically or of necessity from the terms of the 
written constitution. They must be assumed by the existing text to be 
constitutionally guaranteed and are therefore required in order to give proper effect 
to the text itself.85 
1. The Hogan Case  
The Hogan case involved a challenge to the validity of the Constitution 
Amendment, 1998 (Newfoundland Act), which was enacted under the amending 
procedure set out in section 43 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The amendment 
________________________________________________________________ 
82
 Monahan, “The Public Policy Role of the Supreme Court in the Secession Reference” 
(1999), 11 N.J.C.L. 65, at 77-80. 
83
 Monahan, “The Legal Framework Governing Secession in Light of the Quebec 
Secession Reference” (Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures 2000, 8-9 June 2000). 
84
 Hogan v. Newfoundland (Attorney General) (2000), 183 D.L.R. (4th) 225 (Nfld. C.A.) 
85
 Monahan, supra, note 83, at 12. [Emphasis added.] 
218 Supreme Court Law Review (2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
 
Job Name: SCLR14      Time:00:19       1st proofs  Date:Saturday, February 11, 2012 
modified Term 17 of the Terms of Union between Canada and Newfoundland, 
which terms are scheduled to the Newfoundland Act, itself a part of the 
Constitution of Canada. The amendment had the effect of abrogating 
denominational school rights and privileges in the province, and its validity was 
challenged on several grounds, including the argument that it infringed the 
constitutional principles of the rule of law and the protection of minorities as 
well as an obligation to negotiate, in light of the Quebec Secession Reference. 
The Attorneys General for Newfoundland and Canada contended for the 
legality of the amendment. In extensive reasons for judgment, the Court of 
Appeal in Hogan86 upheld the validity of the amendment, notably on the basis 
that the applicable amending procedure set out in the provisions of the 
Constitution was clear, and its terms had been complied with. The Court of 
Appeal stated, inter alia: 
 
In interpreting the Constitution of Canada, one cannot ignore the history of its 
development. [...] However, the fact that we now have constitutional documents to 
which we can refer collectively as the Constitution does not eliminate all reference 
to our largely unwritten constitutional past. Not every nuance of the powers of the 
different heads of government, for example, is written in the Constitution. Even 
with a written document, certain underlying assumptions will be seen as being self-
evident and of constitutional stature. The New Brunswick Broadcasting case 
required the Court to express what was unwritten. Here the appellants would have 
this Court defeat a constitutionally mandated process by reference to the 
“fundamental or original principles.” However, unlike the Provincial Court Judges 
Reference or the New Brunswick Broadcasting case, here the Court is being asked 
to read in requirements, not to confirm some long-accepted unwritten principle of 
the Constitution but to limit the application of the amending provisions to a right 
that was granted by the written Constitution. This is not a case where the unwritten 
assumptions of educational rights need to be stated by the Courts. The rights are 
fully explored and stated in Term 17. Term 17 is a complete statement of 
denominational education rights. No other term written or unwritten of the 
Constitution need be called upon to interpret Term 17 or to determine how it should 
be amended. Neither the rule of law nor respect for minorities prevents the 
application of s. 43 to the amendment of Term 17. [...] The appropriate provision in 
Part V of the Constitution having been complied with, the validity of the 
amendment to Term 17 cannot be questioned.87 
________________________________________________________________ 
86
 The original statement of claim invoked the purported existence of constitutional 
conventions in this regard, but with the advent of the Supreme Court of Canada‟s decision in the 
Quebec Secession Reference, the challenge was broadened to include argument based on 
constitutional principles. Riche J.‟s reasons at trial are predicated on the question of constitutional 
conventions (an argument he rejected), and the appellants did not pursue the conventions issue on 
appeal, focussing instead on principles. 
87
 Hogan, supra, note 84, at para. 125. 
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2. The Brown, Bacon and Westergarde-Thorpe Cases 
The approach of the Newfoundland Court of Appeal in the Hogan case, 
however, is basically consistent with the findings of the Alberta and 
Saskatchewan Courts of Appeal in the Brown and Bacon cases, respectively, 
and that of the Federal Court of Appeal in Westergard-Thorpe. In Brown, the 
Court of Appeal agreed with the position of the Attorney General of Canada 
that the applicant, in seeking a judicial declaration that the appointment of 
Senators by the Governor General in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 was contrary to democratic principle, was attempting to 
use the courts to pronounce upon a non-justiciable issue. 
 
We agree with the Crown that the appellant “seeks to invoke the democratic 
principle, per se, divorced of its interpretive role and devoid of legal issues, simply 
because a declaratory order from the Court would, in his view, „have considerable 
persuasive effect, and it would confer democratic legitimacy on the Senatorial 
Selection Act.‟ ”88 
 
In Bacon and Westergard-Thorpe, the appellate courts refused to accept the 
contention that statutory provisions enacted by the legislature of Saskatchewan 
and by the Parliament of Canada, respectively, should be invalidated on the 
basis of an expansive view89 of the principle of the rule of law, in circumstances 
where there was no breach of the Charter of Rights, and where the provisions 
were not ultra vires — in other words, where there was no breach of section 52 
of the Constitution Act, 1982 as concerned the provisions of the Constitution. In 
upholding the impugned legislation, the courts gave effect to another 
constitutional principle: parliamentary supremacy. Wrote Wakeling J.A. for the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Bacon,90 the protection afforded by the rule 
of law in a democratic country is twofold: protection “by our courts against 
________________________________________________________________ 
88
 Brown v. Alberta (1999), 177 D.L.R. (4th) 349, at para. 25 (Alta. C.A.). 
89
 This approach suggests that beyond the generally accepted purview of the rule of law as 
a guarantee against arbitrary governmental action, and of the principle that laws should be made 
according to law and not otherwise (in other words, respect for manner and form requirements and 
orderly processes in law-making), the rule of law should also englobe a substantive protection 
against purported arbitrariness by Parliament or a legislature in enacting laws that abrogate 
previous contractual undertakings by government or that remove related causes of action and thus 
ancillary access to the courts for redress. Vide Monahan, “Is the Pearson Airport Legislation 
Unconstitutional?: The Rule of Law as a Limit on Contract Repudiation by Government” (1995), 
33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 411. However, see Hogg and Monahan, Liability of the Crown, 3rd ed. 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2000), at 223, for some sober second thoughts on this approach in light of 
Bacon (and other cases). 
90
 Bacon v. Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corp. (1999), 180 Sask. R. 20, 205 W.A.C. 20 
(C.A.). 
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arbitrary and unlawful actions by officials,” and “protection against arbitrary 
legislation […] by the democratic process” of calling legislators to account 
through the ballot box. Thus, the principle of the rule of law posits “the law as 
it exists from time to time.” It “does not create a restriction on Parliament‟s 
right to make laws;” it is, rather, a recognition that when laws are made, “they 
are then applicable to all, including governments.”91 Wakeling J.A. prefaced 
those remarks with this comment on the Quebec Secession Reference: 
 
I am unable to accept that these justices of the Supreme Court, whilst providing an 
analysis of our federal system, were at the same time engaged in changing that 
system. This is particularly so when we are not talking of a subtle or marginal 
change, but one which would reduce the supremacy of Parliament by subjecting it 
to the scrutiny of superior court judges to be sure it did not offend the rule of law 
and if it did, to determine whether it was an arbitrary action. 92 
 
Strayer J.A., writing for the Federal Court of Appeal in Westergard-Thorpe, 
“respectfully agreed” with that observation. The rule of law requires that “the 
relationship between the state and the individual must be regulated by law.”93 
This principle should not be construed as “having put an end to another 
constitutional principle, namely the supremacy of Parliament or the supremacy 
of legislatures when acting in their own domain.”94 In other words, in these 
cases, the courts balanced the principle of the rule of law with that of 
parliamentary supremacy. 
X. A DELICATE BALANCE 
The delicate balance achieved by the courts in construing constitutional 
principles — whether inter se or with reference to the textual provisions of the 
Constitution — is, as I have argued earlier in this paper, a means of ensuring a 
necessary margin of flexibility in the application of the terms of the formal 
Constitution and their adaptation to new or changing circumstances. Like all 
tools of construction, however, constitutional principles have their limits. A 
healthy tension will likely continue to exist between the need, on the one hand, 
to understand constitutional principles as flowing from the words, meaning and 
interpretation of the constitutional text, and the evident desire, on the other 
hand (in specified circumstances), to give those principles virtually the force of 
________________________________________________________________ 
91
 Id., at para. 30. 
92
 Id., at para. 29. 
93
 Singh v. Canada (Attorney General) (sub nom. Westergard-Thorpe v. Canada (Attorney 
General)), [2000] 3 F.C. 185, at paras. 33, 35 (C.A.). 
94
 Id., at para. 12. 
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constitutional provisions themselves. This contrast between deductive and 
inductive reasoning in relation to constitutional principles reached its zenith in 
the Provincial Judges Reference. For Chief Justice Lamer, the preamble to the 
Constitution Act, 1867 “recognizes and affirms the basic principles which are 
the very source of the substantive provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867.” 
Those provisions, he added, “merely elaborate those organizing principles.”95 
For Mr. Justice La Forest, the provisions of the Constitution are not simply 
elaborations upon unwritten principles; rather, the provisions “are the 
Constitution.”96 While La Forest J. did not deny that the Constitution “embraces 
unwritten rules, including rules that find expression in the preamble of the 
Constitution Act, 1867,” in his opinion, “these rules really find their origin in 
specific provisions of the Constitution viewed in light of our constitutional 
heritage. In other words, what we are concerned with is the meaning to be 
attached to an expression used in a constitutional provision.”97 
XI. LEGAL CERTAINTY AND THE  
LEGITIMACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Chief Justice Lamer did, however, make an important proviso regarding the 
role of constitutional principles. He declared: 
 
However, I do wish to add a note of caution. As I said in New Brunswick 
Broadcasting, supra, at p. 355, the constitutional history of Canada can be 
understood, in part, as a process of evolution “which [has] culminated in the 
supremacy of a definitive written constitution.” There are many important reasons 
for the preference for a written constitution over an unwritten one, not the least of 
which is the promotion of legal certainty and through it the legitimacy of 
constitutional judicial review.98 
 
La Forest J. also underscored the point that the legitimacy of judicial review 
depends upon “the interpretation of an authoritative constitutional 
instrument.”99 This legitimacy is jeopardized, in his view, “when courts attempt 
________________________________________________________________ 
95
  Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island; 
Reference re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward 
Island; R. v. Campbell; R. v. Ekmcic; R. v. Wickman; Manitoba Provincial Court Judges Assn. v. 
Manitoba (Minister of Justice), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 95, per Lamer C.J. (emphasis added). 
96
 Id., at para. 319 (emphasis in reasons of La Forest J.).  
97
 Id., at para. 303. 
98
 Id., at para. 93. “[T]hese concerns,” added Lamer C.J., “go to the heart” of 
constitutionalism itself. 
99
  Id., at para. 315. 
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to limit the power of legislatures without recourse to express textual 
authority.”100  
In the Quebec Secession Reference, a unanimous Court repeated Chief 
Justice Lamer‟s caution in the Provincial Judges Reference in the following 
terms: 
 
In the Provincial Judges Reference, supra, at paras. 93 and 104, we cautioned that 
the recognition of these constitutional principles (the majority opinion referred to 
them as “organizing principles” and described one of them, judicial independence, 
as an “unwritten norm”) could not be taken as an invitation to dispense with the 
written text of the Constitution. On the contrary, we confirmed that there are 
compelling reasons to insist upon the primacy of our written constitution. A written 
constitution promotes legal certainty and predictability, and it provides a 
foundation and a touchstone for the exercise of constitutional judicial review.101 
 
These twin issues of certainty in the law and the legitimacy of judicial 
review (as well as their linkage with a written constitution) are not new; nor are 
they limited to the Canadian experience. As we have seen, Chief Justice 
Marshall of the American Supreme Court confronted them in Marbury v. 
Madison almost 200 years ago, and the principle of judicial review triumphed 
on the basis of the need to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution‟s 
provisions over the ordinary laws of Congress. The same issues have arisen in 
________________________________________________________________ 
100
 Id., at para. 316. La Forest J. goes on to invoke the principles of democracy and 
parliamentary supremacy in examining various dicta by members of the Court over the years 
(especially prior to the Charter) that have suggested that the curtailment of political expression by 
Parliament or by the provincial legislatures would be ultra vires them both. While neither 
approving nor rejecting the so-called “implied bill of rights” theory, he denied that it could justify 
resort to the preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867 in the context of judicial independence. 
“Although it has been suggested that guarantees of political freedom flow from the preamble, [...] 
this position is untenable. The better view is that if these guarantees exist, they are implicit in s. 17 
of the Constitution Act, 1867, which provides for the establishment of Parliament; [...] More 
important, the justification for implied political freedoms is that they are supportive, and not 
subversive, of legislative supremacy. That doctrine holds that democratically constituted 
legislatures, and not the courts, are the ultimate guarantors of civil liberties, including the right to 
an independent judiciary” (at para. 318). 
101
 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 53. In Re Eurig Estate, 
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 565, at para. 66, Mr. Justice Binnie observed: “As the Court recently affirmed in 
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, implicit principles can and should be used 
to expound the Constitution, but they cannot alter the thrust of its explicit text.” Binnie J., writing 
for himself and McLachlin J. (as she then was), demurred from his colleague Justice Major‟s 
interpretation of the purpose of section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867 on the basis of a principle 
of strict construction to the effect that taxation powers cannot arise incidentally in delegated 
legislation. 
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France102 and Australia in recent years,103 for example, as these nations‟ judges 
have attempted to infuse the constitutions of their countries with constitutional 
principles and an implied bill of rights (in the case of France, “principes à 
valeur constitutionnelle”104 derived from the preamble to the Constitution of the 
Fifth Republic and incorporating the Déclaration des droits de l’homme of 
1789). The same issues will no doubt face the Appellate Committee of the 
House of Lords and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, respectively, 
in the interpretation and application of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42) on 
the one hand, and of the UK devolution statutes  the Government of Wales 
Act 1998 (c. 38), the Scotland Act 1998 (c. 46), and the Northern Ireland Act 
1998 (c. 47)  on the other.105 
1. The French Experience 
Professor Dominique Turpin argues persuasively that in France, like a good 
Beaujolais, “le droit constitutionnel nouveau est arrivé,” that is to say, constitutional 
law which takes into account the jurisprudence flowing from the increased activity 
of the Conseil constitutionnel, and which has had the effect of enlarging the scope 
of constitutional law as well as progressively constitutionalizing all branches of law. 
Nor is this simply a case of pouring new wine into old bottles. 
 
Quel politiste pourrait aujourd‟hui ignorer l‟incontestable «saisine de la politique 
par le droit» dans la mesure où, d‟une part, des textes sont enfins venus réglementer 
ce qui était jadis au-delà du droit […] et où, d‟autre part, le juge constitutionnel se 
________________________________________________________________ 
102
 Vide Turpin, Droit constitutionnel, 4th ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1999); Drago, François, Molfessis (eds.), La légitimité de la jurisprudence du Conseil 
constitutionnel (Paris: Editions Economica, 1999): “Depuis plus d‟un quart de siècle, le contrôle de 
constitutionnalité connâit un développement sans précédent en France, sous l‟égide d‟un Conseil 
constitutionnel s‟étant proclamé gardien des droits et libertés constitutionnelles” (at v). Indeed, the 
growth of constitutional judicial review throughout Europe is a significant phenomenon and a 
common trait: Rousseau, La justice constitutionnelle en Europe, 3rd ed. (Paris: Montchrestien, 
1998).  
103
 Vide Hanks and Cass, Australian Constitutional Law: Materials and Commentary, 6th 
ed. (Sydney: Butterworths, 1999). “One effect of the High Court‟s recent bout of activism has been 
to engender a debate within the Australian community concerning the proper limits of judicial 
activism, or law-making” (at 19). 
104
 Turpin, supra, note 102, at 111. For a lucid analysis of the legal weight and content of 
the preamble and the jurisprudence of the Conseil constitutionnel in this regard, see pp. 104-15.  
105
 Vide Le Sueur and Cornes, What Do the Top Courts Do? (London: Constitution Unit, 
School of Public Policy, University College London, 2000); Newman, “Adjudicating Divisions of 
Powers Issues: A Canadian Perspective” (London and Edinburgh Seminars on Reforming the UK‟s 
Top Courts: Lessons From Comparative Policy, Economic and Social Research Council‟s Future 
Governance Programme, July 2001). 
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trouve désormais placé au coeur des controverses politiques, obligeant les acteurs 
de ce jeu à formuler de plus en plus leurs interventions en termes juridiques? De ce 
nouvel état découlent trois séries de conséquences, relatives à la nature même du 
droit constitutionnel (qui est bouleversée), à son champ d‟application (qui est 
élargi) et à sa place vis-à-vis les autres branches du droit (qui est rehaussée). 
 
Quant à la nature du droit constitutionnel, il s‟agit bien d‟un retour au texte (et aux 
«principes à valeur constitutionnelle»), mais tel qu‟il est interprété par un organe 
extérieur au jeu politique […] doté d‟une légitimité technique désormais supérieure 
à la légitimité démocratique de la majorité. […] 
Quant au champ d‟application du droit constitutionnel, il s‟est nécessairement 
élargi, dépassant la simple description du fonctionnement des institutions étatiques 
[…] pour englober les sources du droit, tant privé que public d‟ailleurs, et tant 
national que local […] ou international […] mais aussi, du fait de l‟insertion du 
préambule dans la Constitution, la protection des libertés publiques. […] 
Quant au rang du droit constitutionnel par rapport aux autres branches du droit, il ne 
peut être aujourd‟hui que le premier. Après être demeuré, trop longtemps, un infra- ou 
un sous-droit par défaut de sanction effective de ses prescriptions au temps de la 
«souveraineté parlementaire», le droit constitutionnel a non seulement rattrapé les 
autres branches du droit mais, en même temps, les domine dans une certaine 
mesure.106 
 
This development raises, in turn, questions about legitimacy (questions of 
the sort that concerned La Forest J. in the Provincial Judges Reference). 
Professor Dominique Rousseau has captured these questions well: 
 
Dans la tradition démocratique «classique», le principe de légitimité consacré dans 
tous les textes constitutionnels modernes est en effet la souveraineté populaire. 
Titulaire du pouvoir, le peuple est, en démocratie, au principe de toutes choses: il 
décide, il délègue, il sanctionne, il contrôle, il juge, mais il ne peut être lui-même 
jugé, sanctionné ou contrôlé. Car s‟il pouvait l‟être, il faudrait nécessairement poser 
l‟existence «au-dessus» du peuple d‟un lieu où se trouvent les valeurs, les règles de 
jugement des actions du peuple. En démocratie, le peuple, c‟est la Cour suprême, 
pour paraphraser le général de Gaulle. 
Or, dans son principe, la justice constitutionnelle s‟inscrit contre cette conception-là 
de la démocratie puisqu‟elle se définit comme le pouvoir donné à des personnes 
nommées d‟apprécier, de contrôler et le cas échéant, de sanctionner la conformité à la 
constitution des actes pris par les pouvoirs publics et en particulier, des lois votées par 
les représentants élus du peuple souverain. […] 
________________________________________________________________ 
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 Turpin, supra, note 102, at 5-7.  
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La justice constitutionnelle inaugure ainsi une formidable mutation politique et, en 
même temps, provoque une formidable renouveau de la théorie et de la philosophie 
juridique et politique: qui dit le droit? Le droit peut-il être «arraché» à la 
souveraineté populaire? La loi cède-elle devant la jurisprudence? Comment se 
«fait» la jurisprudence? Est-ce la consécration d‟une religion ou d‟une 
métaphysique juridique?…107 
2. The Australian Experience 
In Australia, the Commonwealth Constitution is a written text, including a 
preamble and eight chapters forming the body of the Constitution. The preamble 
recites that the people have agreed to unite in one indissoluble federal 
Commonwealth under the Crown. This is understood as incorporating concepts of 
popular legitimacy, federalism and constitutional monarchy. In their very useful and 
exhaustive study, Professors Peter Hanks and Deborah Cass inform us that in 
addition to the text, “the Constitution also contains principles which are said to 
derive from its structure and purpose.”108 These principles include responsible 
government, federalism, representative democracy and the separation of powers, all 
of which are said to be reflected, although not explicitly set out, in the text. The 
Constitution‟s history and the overlay of judicial interpretation on the text are also 
crucial to the content of the Constitution. For example, Hanks and Cass note that 
“one of the major constitutional issues for the High Court over the years has been 
the question of whether the principle of federalism mandates full unification or only 
integration of Australian institutions.”109 The way in which the federal principle is 
construed and applied by the Court can thus have “a profound effect on the shape of 
constitutional outcomes.”110 As in Canada, the United States and elsewhere, 
textualism, originalism (or intentionalism) and dynamism (or progressivism or 
organicism) vie for dominance. “Each method of constitutional interpretation has its 
problems,” and “[n]o judge is totally committed to one method of interpretation 





 Rousseau, supra, note 102, at 9-11. 
108
 Supra, note 103, at 5; emphasis in original. (Hanks is now a barrister, but for three 
decades taught at Monash and Sydney Universities; Cass is a senior lecturer at the Faculty of Law, 
Australian National University.) 
109
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It has broad-ranging practical effects because it signals, especially to the wider 
community, the nature of the role the High Court plays in legal and political 
affairs.112 
 
Hanks and Cass suggest that the role which the High Court has played in the 
evolution of constitutional law in Australia has been “essential to its survival.” 
In light of the rigidity of the constitutional amendment process, “it has been 
judicial interpretation and re-interpretation which has managed to keep the 
structure of government, as expressed in the Constitution, in touch with the 
demands of a changing society and developing economy.”113 Hanks and Cass 
later cite commentator Brian Galligan114 for the proposition that Sir Owen 
Dixon‟s classic plea, upon acceding to the position of Chief Justice, for “close 
adherence to legal reasoning” and a “strict and complete legalism,”115 has in 
fact “been championed by the Court because it is an effective political strategy 
for exercising judicial review”116 in a country essentially hostile to that 
function, notably because of a tradition of parliamentary supremacy inherited 
from Britain. 
The High Court‟s decisions in 1992 in Nationwide News Pty. Ltd v. Wills117 
and Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth118 were of great 
significance for the recent development of Australian constitutional law. In those 
cases, a majority of the Court held that principles of representative and 
responsible government were implied in the Constitution, which in turn, 
therefore, required freedom of communication in regard to political matters. 
Moreover, Commonwealth and state legislation found in violation of those 
principles would be held invalid.  
To quote from the concurring opinion of Brennan J., the principles of 
representative democracy, direct popular election, the national character of the 
lower House and the principle of responsible government are “constitutional 
________________________________________________________________ 
112
 Id. For a timely and thoughtful discussion of originalism and other schools of thought in 
the Canadian context, see the recent article by my colleague Luanne Walton, “Making Sense of 
Constitutional Interpretation” (2001), 12:3 N.J.C.L. 315. 
113
 Id., at 31. This has particular resonance in Canada. 
114
 Galligan, “Realistic „Realism‟ and the High Court‟s Political Role” (1989), 18 Federal 
L.R. 40. 
115
 Dixon C.J. is cited in Hanks and Cass, supra, note 103, at 32. Vide: (1952) 85 C.L.R. 
xiv. (See also the discussion in Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Scarborough, Ont.: 
Carswell, 1997), at 129-30). 
116
 Galligan, supra, note 114. Galligan in turn, has been criticized by Jeffrey Goldsworthy 
for oversimplifying the Court‟s jurisprudence over 90 years as well as the complexities of 
constitutional adjudication: Goldsworthy, “Realism about the High Court” (1989), 18 Federal L.R. 
27. 
117
 (1992) 177 C.L.R. 1. 
118
 (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106. 
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imperatives” intended to make both the legislative and executive branches of 
government “ultimately answerable to the Australian people.”119 
 
Under the Westminster model, these principles might be trespassed upon by 
legislation emanating from an omnicompetent Parliament but the Parliament of the 
Commonwealth is incompetent to alter the principles prescribed by the Constitution 
to which it owes its existence. It is a Constitution the text of which the people alone 
can change: s. 128. 
 
To sustain a representative democracy embodying the principles prescribed by the 
Constitution, freedom of public discussion of political and economic matters is 
essential […]120 
 
Noting Hanks and Cass, these decisions “were seen at the time as opening 
the way for a judicially constructed Bill of Rights for Australia,”121 which has 
neither a constitutionally-entrenched Charter of Rights nor a statutory Bill of 
Rights (as has existed for Canada since 1960 and for New Zealand since 1990). 
These constitutional principles (or “constitutional implications”) however, were 
qualified in later cases122 as being more in the nature of a fetter on legislative 
action (a negative restraint) rather than a source of positive rights. The implied 
freedom of communication, writes Sir Anthony Mason, was also “tied […] 
more closely to the express provisions of the Constitution.”123 
Sir Anthony makes the case (as does Professor Monahan in Canada) for a 
“necessary implications” test in construing and applying constitutional 
principles. 
 
Implication is a natural and necessary incident of the process of interpretation, 
whether it is a constitution, a statute or a contract that is being interpreted. […] 
That is not to say that implications are freely made. On the contrary, courts are 
cautious about making implications. They are only made when they give 
________________________________________________________________ 
119
  Per Brennan J. in Nationwide News, supra, note 117, at 47. 
120
 Id. It is interesting to note that extensive reference is made to the classic jurisprudence 
of the Supreme Court of Canada in this area, including Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 
100; Saumur v. Quebec (City), [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299; and Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 285. 
(The majority judgment in Nationwide News is made up of a series of concurring opinions; see also, 
most notably, Mason C.J. and Deane and Toohey JJ., respectively.) 
121
 Hanks and Cass, supra, note 103, at 904. 
122
 Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104; Lange v. 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520. See also Leeth v. Commonwealth 
(1992) 174 C.L.R. 455; Kruger v. Commonwealth (1997) 146 A.L.R. 126. 
123
 The Hon. Sir Anthony Mason, “The Role of the Judiciary in Developing Human Rights 
in Australian Law” in Kinley, ed., Human Rights in Australian Law: Principles, Practice and 
Potential (Leichhardt, N.S.W.: Federation Press, 1998), Chapter 2, at 38, referring particularly to 
the Lange decision. 
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expression to the intention of the relevant instrument as that intention is revealed by 
reference to its language considered in the light of context (including history) and 
the nature and purpose of the instrument. 
 
That is why reference is made to “necessary implications,” indicating that an 
implication is not made unless it is necessary. Here, however, a distinction must be 
drawn between the making of an implication based simply on a manifestation of 
intention to be gathered from the provisions of the Constitution, in which event one 
is concerned only to ascertain whether that intention is manifested, and an 
implication based on the structure of the Constitution. In the latter case the 
implication must be logically or practically necessary for the preservation of the 
integrity of that structure.124 
 
Sir Anthony concludes that with the notable exception of the implied freedom 
of communication (itself quite singular in nature and distinguishable from other 
human rights because it is “representation-reinforcing, necessitated by the system 
of representative (and responsible) government for which the Constitution by its 
very provisions and structures provides”125), “little has been achieved by the High 
Court in implying human rights protection in the Constitution.”126 
 
In the ultimate analysis, this is because the Australian Constitution is an instrument 
which defines the structure of government and distributes the power of government 
rather than one which defines rights and freedoms in conformity with the British 
parliamentary tradition and the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy.127 
 
Nonetheless, the dynamic school of interpretation has been and no doubt will 
continue to be one of the important contending approaches of Australian 
constitutional law, as exemplified by the statement of Isaacs J. that 
constitutions are “made, not for a single occasion, but for the continued life and 
progress of the community,” and are shaped by the “silent operation of 
constitutional principles,”128 as well as that of Windeyer J., who wrote: 
 
In any country where the spirit of the common law holds sway the enunciation by 
courts of constitutional principles based on the interpretation of a written 
constitution may vary and develop in response to changing circumstances.129 
________________________________________________________________ 
124
 Id., at 36-37. 
125
 Id., at 41. 
126




 Commonwealth v. Kreglinger and Furnau Ltd. (1926) 37 C.L.R. 393, at 413. 
129
 Victoria v. Commonwealth (1971) 122 C.L.R. 353, at 396. (For ease of reference, I 
should note that both Isaacs and Windeyer JJ.‟s remarks are drawn from Hanks and Cass, 
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XII. CONCLUSION 
1. The Necessary Linkage Between Constitutional Law and Principles 
Returning now to Canada and to Canadian law, I will begin to hazard some 
final observations and conclusions. Our country‟s constitutional edifice has been 
built up to a high level of development, where the structure is indisputably more 
evident, tangible and complete than it was in former times.  
The 1982 reform brought with it not only the landmark addition of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but also long-overdue recognition 
of aboriginal and treaty rights, confirmation of provincial control over natural 
resources, plenary power to amend the Constitution‟s provisions in Canada 
(through written amending procedures), a constitutional supremacy clause and, 
perhaps most significantly, formal recognition in the Canada Act 1982 of 
Canada‟s full and sovereign status as an independent nation. These major 
structural developments have been overlaid upon the basic division of 
legislative powers and the other essential features of legislative, executive and 
judicial power and historic guarantees that comprise the original British-North 
America Act: the Constitution Act, 1867.  
Since 1982, two further attempts at major constitutional reform have failed to 
be ratified, but a number of more modest constitutional amendments have been 
enacted. Canada has also overcome an unprecedented threat to its constitutional 
integrity, legal order and the rule of law, in a manner that permits the legitimate 
political forces at play within this country to continue to promote their options for 
change within the prevailing constitutional and legal framework, while respecting 
basic rights and fundamental principles.  
Nevertheless, the work is not finished. The Constitution, even as it continues to 
provide the legal and conventional bases for order and stability, must itself be 
capable of growth and adaptation, as changing circumstances and conditions may 
require. Such modifications are sometimes the concrete product of formal 
constitutional amendment, but constitutional amendments are usually difficult to 
achieve. More often than not, change manifests itself over time as the result of 
a slow, evolutionary process of subtle, incremental steps, not all of which lead 
inexorably in the same direction, and the pattern of which is sometimes evident 
only after the fact. 
Canada‟s Supreme Court, like the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
before it, has been instrumental to the growth and development of Canadian 
constitutional law. The judges of the Supreme Court, as well as those of superior 
and appellate courts throughout the land, will continue to exercise their role as 
                                                                                                                                
Australian Constitutional Law: Materials and Commentary, 6th ed. (Sydney: Butterworths, 1999), 
at 11.) 
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the legal arbiters and guardians not only of the provisions of the Constitution, 
but also of the high objects, principles and values upon which the edifice rests. 
The courts must, however, continue to link those principles and values to the 
legal structure and provisions from which the former emanate and draw their 
force. No doubt, that which often distinguishes great judges from good ones is 
their ability to imbue the black letter of the law with extraordinary vision, to 
wed law to the spirit of justice and to temper justice in turn with equity and 
mercy. Still, it is respectfully submitted that sagacious judges will want to 
continue to avoid the temptation of casting aside the dull fetters and material 
confines of the written law in a quest for more exalted quarters in which to 
ruminate and reflect, lest they lay themselves open to the accusation of 
becoming disembodied philosopher-kings and -queens, building constitutional 
castles in the air.130 The realm of abstractions — not only of broad 
constitutional principles but of often vague and esoteric “concepts” and 
“notions”131 — is not of this world.132 Courts can indeed “infuse” and “breathe 
life” into the Constitution, but in so doing they may not stray far from the 
________________________________________________________________ 
130
 The accusation is a mean one, and often overblown, as in Morton and Knopff‟s polemic 
The Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2000). For a 
more subtle (yet no less iconoclastic) opinion on the modern role of the “juge-interprète” and 
judicial power in the making of the law, see Lajoie, Jugements de valeurs: le discours judiciare et 
le droit (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997): “La frontière entre le judiciaire et le 
politique n‟est plus ce qu‟elle était. Et le juge, qui participe à ce processus en donnant sens à un 
texte dont le caractère normatif l‟oblige à tenir compte de l‟effet de son interprétation sur les 
justiciables qu‟il affecte, est devenu l‟arbitre des valeurs dans la société. [...]” (at 207-08). 
131
 Woe to the lawyer who has only a “notion” to assert. “While it may be rooted in notions 
of tolerance and diversity, the exception in s. 93 [of the Constitution Act, 1867, guaranteeing 
denominational school rights and privileges] is not a blanket affirmation of freedom of religion or 
freedom of conscience […] [and] should not be construed as a Charter human right or freedom” 
(per Beetz J. in Greater Montreal Protestant School Board v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 
S.C.R. 377, at 401). “A notion of equality between Canada‟s official language groups is obviously 
present in s. 23. Beyond this, however, the section is, if anything, an exception to the provisions of 
ss. 15 and 27 [of the Charter]” (per Dickson C.J., in Mahe v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, at 369). 
In Société des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. v. Assn. of Parents for Fairness in Education, 
Grand Falls District 50 Branch, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549, at 578, Beetz J. stated that “legal rights tend 
to be seminal in nature because they are rooted in principle,” unlike language rights, “which are 
based on political compromise.” This rather invidious distinction was later overturned in the 
Quebec Secession Reference, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 80 (“we highlight that even though those 
provisions were the product of negotiation and political compromise, that does not render them 
unprincipled”), and the “notion” of equality in section 23 of the Charter and other language rights 
was elevated to the rank of a “principle” in R. v. Beaulac, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768.  
132
 “For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways […] For as the 
heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than 
your thoughts” (Isaiah 55:8-9 King James Version). 
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physical corpus of constitutional law if both are to thrive.133 (Metaphysician, 
heal thyself.) Courts are here, generally speaking,134 to decide concrete issues, 
live controversies and prosaic disputes on the basis of principles of legality, 
“strict logic and high technique.”135  
The resort to “unwritten law” and conceptual abstractions is, of course, 
attractive to the legal mind, and perhaps particularly so to minds trained in the 
common law. “Reason is the life of the law; nay, the common law itselfe is 
nothing but reason,” declaimed the great English jurist, Sir Edward Coke.136 
 
And by reasoning and debating of grave learned men the darknesse of ignorance is 
expelled, and by the light of legall reason the right is discerned, and thereupon 
judgment given according to law, which is the perfection of reason.137 
 
“Which, then, do you think is the sort of law,” wrote the moral philosopher 
and polemicist Jeremy Bentham in 1792, “which the whole host of lawyers, 




 Nor does this mean that the Constitution of Canada will necessarily be better off if, instead 
of being left to the ether, unwritten principles are shoe-horned into the text of the Constitution as if 
they were written constitutional provisions themselves. Vide Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 
supra, note 115, at 9-10, and 13-14, on the “surprising” decision of the Supreme Court in New 
Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319, 
to add the unwritten doctrine of parliamentary privilege to the instruments listed in or scheduled to 
section 52(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 that comprise “the Constitution of Canada” as it is written. 
This mechanistic addition to the text of the Constitution, it is argued, not only mixed apples with 
oranges, but also opened the door to uncertainty — could other doctrines or instruments be judicially 
adduced as coming within the list? — with, as Hogg points out, the attendant “grave consequences” of 
“supremacy and entrenchment” that apply to the listed constitutional instruments. 
134
 There is a difference, but arguably only of degree, when a court is sitting in an advisory 
capacity in the context of a reference (discussed in the next section of this paper). 
135
 Maitland, ed., Year Books of Edward II, Vol. I (London: Quaritch, 1903), at xviii: “The 
qualities that saved English law when the day of trial came in the Tudor age were not vulgar 
common sense and the reflexions of the layman‟s unanalysed instincts: rather they were strict logic 
and high technique, rooted in the Inns of Court, rooted in the Year Books, rooted in the centuries.” 
136
  Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England (1628-1644), drawn from the 1832 printed 
edition (London: J. & W.T. Clarke, Saunders & Benning; Maxwell; S. Sweet; H. Butterworth; 
Stevens & Sons; R. Pheeney; J. Richards), at [97B]. 
137
 Id., at [232B]. Lord Coke did voice at least one criticism of contemporary cases and 
commentary, which he said had lost the authority the “antient lectures or readings upon statutes” 
commanded: “for now the cases are long, obscure, and intricate, full of new conceits, liker rather to 
riddles than lectures, which when they are opened they vanish away like smoke;” and as for the 
readers, “all their studie is to find nice evasions out of the statute.”  
138
  Bentham, Truth versus Ashhurst; or Law as It Is; Contrasted with What it is Said to Be 
(December 1792; first published in 1823). Reproduced in Bowring, ed., The Works of Jeremy 
Bentham (Edinburgh: Tait; London: Simpkin Marshall, 1843), vol. V, at 236. 
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That very sort of bastard law which I have been describing to you, which they 
themselves call the unwritten law, which is no more made than it is written  
which has not so much a shape to appear in  not so much a word which anybody 
can say belongs to it  which comes from nobody, and is addressed to nobody  
and which, so long as it is what it is, can never, by any possibility, be either known 
or settled. 
 
How should lawyers be otherwise than fond of this brat of their own begetting? Or 
how should they bear to part with it? It carries in its hand a rule of wax, which they 
twist about as they please  a hook to lead the people by the nose, and a pair of 
sheers to fleece them with.139 
2.  The Role of the Courts in the Constitutional System and Their Area of 
Expertise 
How, then, to achieve both needed flexibility and certainty in the supreme 
law of Canada, in relation to unwritten principles? A golden metewand140 has 
been established by the Supreme Court in the Quebec Secession Reference. It is 
intimately linked to the legitimate role of the courts in our constitutional 
framework. We would do well to be guided by its wisdom.  
In answer to a preliminary objection to the exercise of its jurisdiction in this 
reference, the Supreme Court made a number of key observations. First, the 
Court acknowledged that in a reference,141 the Court is acting in “an advisory 
capacity” rather than in its “traditional adjudicative function.” In this context, 
the Court can find itself engaged in examining hypothetical questions “in an 
________________________________________________________________ 
139
 Id. (Emphasis in original.) The pamphlet was written in response to Mr. Justice John 
Ashhurst‟s charge to a Middlesex Grand Jury on November 19, 1792, in which Justice Ashhurst‟s 
propositions are set out (e.g., “Happily for us, we are not bound by any laws but such as every man 
has the means of knowing.”) and to which Benthham (“Truth”) replies. “It is the judges,” Bentham 
rejoins, “that make the common law. Do you know how they make it? Just as a man makes laws for 
his dog. When your dog does anything you want to break him of, you wait till he does it, and then 
beat him for it. This is the way you make laws for your dog: and this is the way the judges make 
law for you and me. […] What way, then, has any man of coming at this dog-law? Only by 
watching their proceedings: by observing in what cases they have hanged a man, in what cases they 
have sent him to jail, in what cases they have seized his goods, and so forth. The French have had 
enough of this dog-law; they are turning it as fast as they can into statute law, that everybody may 
have a rule to go by: nor do they ever make a law without doing all they can think of to let every 
creature among them know of it. The French have done many abominable things, but is this one of 
them?” 
140
 The expression belonged to Lord Coke (i.e., “the golden metewand of the law”). 
141
 The “special jurisdiction” of the Court and the power of the Governor in Council to refer 
questions to it for consideration and response are set out in section 53 of the Supreme Court Act, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26. 
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exercise it would never entertain in the context of litigation.”142 Second, the 
Court emphasized that even in the context of a reference, the Court should not 
“entertain questions that would be inappropriate to answer.” In this context, 
however, the focus is not “on whether the dispute is formally adversarial or 
whether it disposes of cognizable rights.” Rather, the Court must consider 
“whether the dispute is appropriately addressed by a court of law.”143 
The Court cited its opinion in Reference re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), 
wherein it was stated as follows:  
 
In exercising its discretion whether to determine a matter that is alleged to be non-
justiciable, the Court‟s primary concern is to retain its proper role within the 
constitutional framework of our democratic form of government. ... In considering 
its appropriate role the Court must determine whether the question is purely 
political in nature and should, therefore, be determined in another forum or whether 
it has a sufficient legal component to warrant the intervention of the judicial 
branch.144 
 
Therefore, the circumstances in which the Court might decline to respond on 
the basis of “non-justiciability,” even in the context of a reference, to a question 
put to it, would include: 
 
(1) if to do so would take the Court beyond its own assessment of its proper 
role in the constitutional framework of our democratic form of 
government; or 
(2) if the Court could not give an answer that lies within its area of 
expertise: the interpretation of law.145 
 
It is respectfully submitted that these same considerations may have some 
bearing  not only in the context of a reference, but a fortiori, in the normal 
course of adversarial litigation  on the degree to which the courts should 
generally entertain arguments that are based almost exclusively on 
constitutional principles (in contrast to constitutional or statutory provisions).  
________________________________________________________________ 
142
 Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra, note 131, at para. 25. 
143
 Id., at para. 26. [Emphasis added.] 
144
 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525, at 545. [Underlining added by the Court in the Quebec Secession 
Reference, supra, note 131, at para. 26.] 
145
 Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra, note 131, at para. 26. [Emphasis added.] 
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3. Some Related Questions and Guidance for the Courts 
This is not to say that constitutional principles do not have their place in 
constitutional adjudication. The weight of the jurisprudence (and, it is hoped, this 
paper) demonstrates that they can perform a useful and necessary role in elucidating 
and enriching constitutional meaning. Before giving full play to constitutional 
principles in a given case, however, courts might ask themselves several of the 
following questions. 
Is the principle relevant to the interpretation of a constitutional or statutory 
provision at issue? Can the words of the provision reasonably bear the construction 
placed upon them by the party contending for the application of the principle, or do 
they alter the basic thrust of the text? Is resort to the principle essential to the 
disposition of the case? Are we being asked to apply the principle in furtherance of 
a constitutional provision, or in lieu of one? If it is the latter, what normative force 
or weight should the principle carry in these circumstances? Should it be balanced 
with other constitutional principles or textual considerations? Does the principle we 
are asked to invoke establish a duty, rule or obligation of a constitutional character? 
If so, whom will it bind: the parties to the case? Political actors? The courts? 
Everyone? Is it enforceable at law, or is it a political obligation in the nature of a 
constitutional convention? If it is a convention, does it satisfy the test formulated by 
Jennings146 for the existence of a convention? Is it appropriate, in the circumstances 
of the case, to pronounce upon the existence of a convention or to apply the 
principle? Shall applying the principle assist in resolving the controversy at issue 
and in clarifying the state of the law? Will reliance upon the principle reduce legal 
uncertainty, or will it contribute to it?  
These ancillary questions can all be seen as elements of the larger issues 
formulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession 
Reference. Are the courts being asked to go beyond their proper role in the 
constitutional framework? Are the courts being asked to give answers that lie 
within their area of expertise: the interpretation of law?  
If those considerations are borne in mind, constitutional principles will 
continue to act as the foundation stones of the constitutional structure. If those 




 Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, 5th ed. (London: University of London Press, 
1959). 
